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In the past twenty-five years, research into policing has grappled increasingly with the 
problem of legitimacy. Prompted by Tyler’s (2006) groundbreaking work, criminologists 
have recognized that subjects of state-sponsored forces must see the police as right, proper 
and entitled to be obeyed (Tyler and Huo 2002; Schulhofer et al. 2011). Tyler’s procedural 
justice model of policing states that when institutions act with procedural fairness, this 
generates the legitimacy that helps to sustain and strengthen the ability of legal authorities to 
elicit compliance and cooperation from those they protect and regulate (Sunshine & Tyler 
2003).  
 
This legitimacy-based framework has been confirmed by an impressive body of empirical 
results. Links between legitimacy, compliance and cooperation have been shown to be 
portable across divergent policing contexts and in different national contexts, including the 
United Kingdom (Jackson et al. 2012a; Tankebe 2013), Africa (Tankebe 2009; Bradford et 
al. 2014; Jackson et al. 2014), Israel (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 2014), and Asia (Cheng 
2015). Yet, in another respect the literature on procedural justice is narrowly focused. It 
largely concerns those elements of police behaviour that are immediately visible to the 
public, such as whether individuals are treated fairly in the context of direct, interpersonal 
interactions. But policing is a more complex enterprise. It has many elements beyond the 
immediately observable aspect of individual officers’ behaviour within the context of citizen 
encounters. Over the twentieth century, policing in many Western countries became 
increasingly complex (Reiss 1992; Reiner 2010), with officers asked to take on a wider array 
of responsibility beyond mere crime control, like counterterrorism (Tyler et al. 2010; Huq et 
al. 2011a), sporting event security (Coaffee et al. 2011) and managing the public’s fear of 
crime (Loader and Walker 2007).  
 
In this paper we argue that, by focusing closely on the physical interaction between officers 
and community members, the procedural justice literature has maintained a conception of 
policing that has been outpaced by growing institutional complexity. First, only a handful of 
studies (for example, Epp et al. 2014; Jackson et al. 2011; see also Tankebe 2013) have 
recognized the possibility that the distribution of policing resources between different groups 
might inform normative judgements about police. Second, although legitimacy has been 
related to the lawfulness of policing (Schulhofer et al. 2011), it remains unclear whether 
individuals are sufficiently well informed about the specific regulatory and legal constraints 
on police (Meares et al. in press).  
 
Building on recent work on legal socialization (Tyler and Trinkner 2016, forthcoming; 
Trinkner et al. 2016), we address the more intuitively plausible hypothesis that legitimacy 
turns partly on the belief that police generally respect the bounds of their authority, i.e. 
“bounded authority.” As Trinkner and colleagues argue, individuals do not cede unlimited 
power to legal authorities. They demarcate their lives into domains, some of which are off 
limits to the intrusion of formal authority. The notion of bounded authority goes beyond the 
relational nature of procedural justice because it captures processes that represent the misuse 
of power. Relatedly, police increasingly use surveillance technologies, including CCTV, 
wiretaps and bulk internet intercepts, to pursue both counterterrorism and also crime control 
missions (Manning 2011; Harding 2014). These measures have promoted controversy, raising 
the question whether perceptions of police intrusions on privacy impinge on legitimacy. 
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We present a new test of whether a wider array of predicate institutional elements of policing 
explains variation in legitimacy judgements. Our study adds two findings to the literature. On 
the one hand, our survey includes not only standard measures focused on contact with police, 
procedural justice, and effectiveness in crime-control, but distributive justice, bounded 
authority, and (relatedly) individual privacy against electronic surveillance. From a 
conceptual point of view, we treat people’s attitudes towards police behaviour as a species of 
trust, i.e., positive expectations about the ways in which police  act– in particular, by being 
procedurally fair, distributively fair, effective, engaging in acceptable surveillance practices, 
and respecting the limits of their authority. Our framing is consistent with previous UK-based 
research (e.g. Jackson et al., 2012a; Bradford et al., 2015a, 2015b). But importantly, no 
earlier study has tested a similarly broad array of policing elements.  
 
On the other hand, we offer a richer account of the normatively salient aspects of policing to 
contribute to ongoing debates about the nature of legitimacy (Reisig et al. 2007; Bottoms and 
Tankebe 2012; Tyler and Jackson 2013, 2014; Gau, 2014; Johnson et al., 2014). Originally, 
Tyler (2006) treated legitimacy as a combination of institutional trust and duty to obey. Here, 
institutional trust signals individuals’ assessment of officers’ benevolent intentions reflecting 
their belief that legal authority had the right to power, while duty to obey reflects the sense 
that the legal authority has the right to dictate appropriate behaviour (Jackson and Gau 2015). 
This binary conception was then combined and linked to its potential sources in police 
behaviour. Typically, individual officers’ procedural fairness emerged as the single biggest 
predictor.  
 
Recently, however, an alternative formulation of legitimacy has emerged that a priori defines 
as constituent elements of legitimacy what Tyler and others view as potential sources of 
legitimation (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Tankebe 2013; Tankebe et al. 2015). From this 
formulation, for an individual to believe that the police are legitimate, it simply is the case 
that he or she must believe that the police are procedurally fair, distributively fair, effective 
and lawful. If one holds these beliefs, it is not so much that one is likely to also see the police 
as legitimate. That these beliefs are assumed to constitute the view that the police are 
legitimate has an important implication. In work by Tyler and colleagues it was an empirical 
question whether these features may legitimate (with, for example, procedural fairness 
emerging as more important than effectiveness). But in work by Tankebe and colleagues they 
are legitimacy, in the sense that they constitute the perceived right to power.  
 
In this paper we consider the value of a different approach of defining and measuring 
legitimacy. We argue that conceptualizing police legitimacy partly as a ‘contentless’ sense of 
normative alignment (Jackson et al. 2012a, 2012b; Tyler & Jackson 2014; Bradford et al. 
2015) yields an important degree of flexibility in the overarching framework. Instead of 
assuming that legitimacy is “power that embodies” the four elements listed above (Tankebe 
et al. 2015: 2), we treat legitimacy as an overarching belief that legal authorities act 
according to societal expectations of rightful conduct in their use of authority. Crucially, this 
approach allows an empirical investigation of the specific values that ‘populate’ these norms. 
By defining legitimacy as normative alignment, we can then estimate which types of police 
behaviour legitimate the institution in the eyes of citizens.  
 
Drawing on data from a national probability sample of adults in England and Wales, we use 
our wider array of predicate elements of policing to show the value of this approach.  
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Institutional and behavioural predicates of legitimacy judgements 
 
Prior work on the sources of police legitimacy tends to focus on a narrow spectrum of 
behaviour as potential predicates of normative judgement about rightful authority. Tyler 
(2006) explicitly focused on “the judgements people make about their personal experience.” 
In this initial study, Tyler identified qualities such as neutrality, a willingness to listen, efforts 
to be fair, politeness, and respect for citizens’ rights as central elements of procedural justice. 
Subsequent studies focused on citizens’ encounters with police during street stops (Tyler and 
Fagan 2008; Bradford et al. 2009; Tyler et al. 2014; Tyler et al. 2015), zeroing in upon 
individuals’ perception of whether they were stopped for legitimate reasons, treated fairly, 
and given an opportunity to tell their side of the story. These elements of procedural justice 
are found to be associated with legitimacy judgements. These studies have also found only a 
weak relationship between people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of the police (e.g., to 
reduce crime) and legitimacy (e.g. Tyler et al. 2010).  
 
This focus on direct, interpersonal accounts with police officers set the agenda for procedural 
justice scholarship in several ways. The relationship between both positive and negative 
contact with police, for example, has also been intensively studied. Early empirical studies 
finding a striking asymmetry between the large effect of negative contact and the weak effect 
of positive contact (Skogan 2006) have been challenged in subsequent work (Tyler and Fagan 
2008; Bradford et al. 2009; Jackson et al., 2012b). Studies of vehicular stops have focused on 
interpersonal experiences of fairness in the context of discrete encounters (Epp et al. 2014). 
Studies of structural dimensions of policing strategy—such as counterterrorism policing—
have also tended to focus either on interpersonal encounters or on individuals’ perceptions of 
how police behave when they do encounter suspects (Tyler et al. 2010). Indeed, when studies 
go beyond respondents’ direct experience with police to investigate issues of racial fairness 
and profiling, the instruments used focus on how individual members of another racial or 
ethnic group are treated (Huq et al. 2011b). These studies also isolate interpersonal 
interactions as the most important structural aspect of policing beyond respondents’ own 
experience.  
  
A starting premise of the current study is that members of the public develop perceptions of 
police behaviour from sources other than immediate interactions with the police. Individuals 
who have little contact with the police nevertheless have normative judgements of the police 
based on their beliefs about them. These beliefs are linked to media and educators (Peffley 
and Hurwitz 2010) and the societal norms and expectations of police conduct that are 
acquired through legal socialization (Fagan and Tyler 2005; Trinkner and Cohn 2014; Tyler 
and Trinkner, 2016, forthcoming). Legitimacy may also be a product of authority relations as 
much as a cause of authority relations (Harkin 2015). If judgements of police legitimacy are 
founded on information secured not only by direct and indirect interpersonal encounters, but 
also through a wider range of media and educational sources, it is at least possible that 
aspects of police organization or behaviour outside the narrow frame of individual encounters 
will influence legitimacy judgements.  
 
For instance, people may partly judge the legitimacy of the police not only on the procedural 
fairness they demonstrate in contact with members of the public, but also more broadly on 
whether officers seem to respect the limits of their power and authority. Authority boundaries 
represent an essential element of how people define and understand their relationship with 
legal authorities (Tyler and Trinkner 2016, forthcoming; Trinkner et al. 2016). When the 
police overstep the boundaries of their authority by encroaching on domains that are off 
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limits – for instance by getting involved in situations they are seen to have no right to be in – 
individuals may see it as an important breach of the appropriate use of power. Critically, this 
may go above and beyond traditionally conceived concerns about fair treatment and decision-
making, in part because the notion of “bounded authority” references situations and powers 
that citizens believe that police should or should not have the right to operate within (in terms 
of situation) and exercise (in terms of power). This is also distinct from whether officers have 
a legal right to intervene, as citizens’ tend to have little understanding of law in this regard, 
yet make judgements about the appropriateness of police action nonetheless (Meares et al. in 
press). 
 
Moreover, the role of police goes far beyond the provision of physical security from crime 
through street patrols and traffic enforcement. Police are called upon to play many different 
roles, ranging from maintaining order at large public events to preventing terrorism attacks, 
and managing the public’s fear of ordinary crime. In response, police have developed 
complex institutional forms that affect individual citizens’ lives both directly and indirectly. 
For example, as part of their responsibility for protecting against terrorism, police may 
engage in secret electronic surveillance of telephone calls, email, and social media usage. 
Police also rely on potentially intrusive technologies to identify ordinary crime and secure 
evidence by engaging in ongoing monitoring of individuals and even attempting to predict 
the commission of crimes (Manning 2011). Given that police are tasked with a diverse range 
of responsibilities that continually expand (e.g., protecting people “from terror”), it is 
increasingly likely to see public backlash when these tasks purposely or inadvertently lead 
law enforcement into domains that the public (or parts of it) view as off limits to 
governmental authority.  
 
In part because of the important role they play in contemporary society, Loader and Mulcahy 
(2003, 45) have argued that police have become a “condensation symbol” for the state more 
generally. It is through their understanding of the police that people make sense of, and give 
order to, the world. By emphasizing the role of police as a center of law and order and 
meaning within a community, Loader and Mulcahy suggest that police practices can 
influence how people understand their shared aims and endeavors, and develop “collectively 
validated norms of security and order” (Bradford et al. 2014). The symbolic function of 
police provides another reason to examine whether a more diverse array of elements—above 
and beyond direct, interpersonal contact with police during street stops or vehicular stops—
influence public judgements of legitimacy. It is this that we address in the current study. 
 
Challenges to the conceptualization of legitimacy 
 
We also contribute to a longstanding debate about how best to conceptualise legitimacy. In an 
early and influential analysis, Beetham (1991:15) argued that “[t]he key to understanding the 
concept of legitimacy lies in the recognition that it is multi-dimensional in character.” 
Beetham himself identified three elements: (1) conformity to established rules, (2) which can 
be justified by reference to beliefs shared by dominant and subordinate groups; with (3) 
evidence of consent by the subordinate group. In contrast, Tyler (2006: 25) defined 
legitimacy more parsimoniously as an “acceptance by people of the need to bring their 
behaviour into line with the dictates of an external authority.” In a slightly different 
formulation, Tyler and Huo (2002:14) identified legitimacy with “the belief that legal 
authorities are entitled to be obeyed and that the individual ought to defer to their 
judgements.” This definition treats feelings of obligation as central to legitimacy. Consistent 
with these definitions, the canonical means of operationalizing legitimacy in survey 
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instruments has been to include questions on perceived obligation to obey the law, as well as 
confidence and trust in legal authorities (Huq et al. 2011a; Tyler 2006: 45; Tyler and Huo 
2002; Tyler et al. 2010).  
 
Importantly, none of these studies treat measures of police fairness and effectiveness as part 
of the scale of legitimacy. Rather, the behaviour, the inferred intentions and the 
organizational forms of police are all treated as potential predicates of legitimacy. The 
decision by Tyler and others to treat these measures as separate from the concept of 
legitimacy, however, has recently come under attack. Most notably, Tankebe (2013: 105) 
argued that “expressions of obligation to obey the directives of legal authorities cannot 
necessarily be equated to legitimacy”. Tankebe claims that a sense of obligation might be 
explained by a person’s belief that police are so powerful they have no choice but to comply 
with their instructions, as well as by a belief that police authority is normatively justified. The 
concern that a sense of obligation reflects also dull compulsion, as Tankebe argues, or 
adaptive preferences motivated by psychological needs and motivations, as Harkin (2015) 
posits, might imply that legitimacy should not be conceptualised in terms of obligation, but 
rather in terms of how police conduct is evaluated.  
 
Complementing Tankebe’s critique of obligation as a constituent element of legitimacy, 
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) have argued for a multidimensional model of legitimacy 
whereby people’s feelings of obligation to obey is treated as an outcome variable explained in 
part by legitimacy judgements. They argue that legitimacy has four elements. These four 
elements reflect aspects of police conduct and organization that are stipulated a priori as 
aspects of rightful power. First, do police behave in a lawful manner and avoid unlawful 
activities? Second, is policing characterized by distributive fairness by allocating resources 
fairly among groups with competing claims? Third, police efficacy is an element of 
legitimacy for the reasons explained in Tankebe (2013), and summarized above. Finally, 
procedural justice, defined to include both quality of decision-making and quality of 
treatment, is treated as a component of legitimacy, rather than as a predicate cause.  
 
This study favors an approach that focuses on citizens’ more general belief that the police act 
according to societal expectations about appropriate and desirable conduct – a sense of 
normative alignment that is an additional component of legitimacy beyond a felt moral duty 
to obey (Jackson et al. 2012a and 2012b). This way of operationalizing the perceived 
appropriateness of an institution addresses people’s judgements about whether police exercise 
their authority in accordance with widespread values regarding how their power should be 
used. But critically, it does not supply the content of these values (like the approach of 
Tankebe and colleagues). Thus, people will agree with statements like “The police usually act 
in ways that are consistent with my own ideas of right and wrong” because they believe that 
the police embody their values about how power should be exercised. Importantly, however, 
it is an empirical question which values underpin the types of police behaviour that predict 
normative alignment. If we find that procedural fairness and distributive fairness are key 
explanatory factors, for instance, then we might conclude that those are the two salient values 
driving normative expectations about appropriate use of authority. 
 
Finally, when the police act according to citizens’ values about how authority should be 
wielded, this activates a corresponding sense that they, as citizens, should abide by norms 
regarding appropriate law-related behaviour. This normative alignment model suggests that 
an ongoing commitment to collective action can be secured by crafting a social identity 
characterized by a dynamic system of norms that can shape individual members’ ongoing 
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commitments (Thomas et al. 2009). And while the concept of normative alignment was 
initially developed in studies of adult populations in England and Wales, it has also been 
fielded throughout Europe (Jackson et al. 2011; Hough et al. 2013) and in the United States 
(Tyler and Jackson 2014). The latter of which included obligation, trust and confidence, and 
normative alignment as separate elements of legitimacy (Bradford et al, 2014, 2015). Each of 
these three traits, they find, have an independent statistical effect on cooperation (Mazerolle 
et al. 2012).  
 
We also use measures of duty to obey that were designed to more closely tap into a sense of 
consensual obligation. Asking people whether it is their ‘moral duty’ to obey the police aims 
to elicit a positive sense of obligation – something that one is expected or required to do out 
of moral or legal obligation, rather than a negative sense of obedience out of fear of sanction 
or a sense of powerlessness. Duty to obey echoes the Weberian insight that power is 
transformed into authority when it is seen to be legitimate. When one recognises the authority 
of the police, one will defer to their orders, not because of fear of punishment or anticipation 
of reward, but rather because of a sense of moral obligation that is connected to normative 
justifiability (Tyler 2006; Tyler & Jackson, 2013). This normatively grounded obligation to 
obey is assumed to motivate behaviour out of a sense of duty that transcends any sense of 
shared specific values. One allows the power-holder to dictate appropriate behaviour because 
one feels a civic responsibility to do so. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Participants and procedure 
 
Our data come from a seven-country survey conducted as part of the Fiducia project. Funded 
by the European Commission as part of the 7
th
 Framework Programme, the project sought to 
inform policy responses that could speak to both “new” forms of deviant behaviour and 
“conventional” forms of criminality. We selected data from a national probability sample of 
adults in England and Wales conducted by Opinion Research Services (the other countries 
included in the survey were Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and Turkey). The 
sample was generated using random digit dialing, with a response rate of 6.3% (which is 
typical of telephone surveys). Data are weighted to adjust for non-response and deviations 
from a representative national sample. Post-stratification adjustment involved weighting 
respondents’ responses based upon their demographic characteristics of gender, age, 
ethnicity, education, income, region and primary language. Once weighted, the sample can be 
reasonably viewed to approximate a national sample for England and Wales. 
 
Constructs and Measures 
 
All survey-items used Likert-type response scales, with multiple indicators of each 
psychological construct of interest.  
 
Dimensions of Police Behaviour. Respondents were asked a series of questions tapping into 
five dimensions of police behaviour, which we consider to be judgements of the 
trustworthiness of the police. Trust can be defined as the subjective judgement that a trustor 
makes about the likelihood of the trustee following through with an expected and valued 
action under conditions of uncertainty (Jackson & Gau, 2015). An individual may never be 
certain whether officers would turn up promptly if called, or whether those officers would 
treat him or her with respect and dignity once they arrived. But that same individual may 
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nevertheless form judgements about the intentions and capabilities of the officers to fulfil the 
valued functions defined by their social role, and these judgements may powerfully shape that 
individual’s willingness to accept vulnerability by behaving in ways that would otherwise 
seem risky, like coming to the police with information about a crime. In the present study we 
treat these trustworthiness judgements as potential sources of legitimation.  
 
Procedural fairness 
The first judgement concerns procedural fairness (Tyler and Blader 2003; Tyler 2006). 
Respondents were asked to think about the ways by which local police officers interact with 
citizens at an interpersonal level and make decisions when they interact with community 
members:  
 
 Based on what you have heard or your own experience, how often would you say the 
police generally treat people in the UK with respect? 
 Based on what you have heard or your own experience, how often would you say the 
police try to do what is best for the people they are dealing with? 
 About how often would you say that the police make fair and impartial decisions in 
the cases they deal with?   
 And when dealing with people in the UK, how often would you say the police 
generally explain their decisions and actions when asked to do so?  
 
The response alternatives were (1) not at all often, (2) not very often, (3) fairly often and (4) 
very often. As detailed below, in a separate set of questions, respondents asked whether they 
had had recent contact with police, and if so whether the resulting encounter had involved 
procedurally just or unjust conduct by the officer. 
 
Effectiveness 
Second, respondents were asked about the effectiveness of the police, focusing on prevention, 
interdicting criminals and responding quickly in an emergency. Police efficacy has been 
treated as an independent variable in many earlier studies of police legitimacy (e.g., Tyler 
2006; Tyler et al. 2010). Respondents were asked: 
 
 Using a scale of 1-7, how successful do you think the police are at preventing crimes 
in the UK where violence is used or threatened? (1=extremely unsuccessful; 
7=extremely successful) 
 Using a scale of 1-7, how successful do you think the police are at catching people 
who commit house burglaries in the UK? (1=extremely unsuccessful; 7=extremely 
successful) 
 If a violent crime were to occur near where you live and the police were called, how 




Third, in a more novel set of questions (see Trinkner et al. 2016), respondents were asked 
about the frequency by which police officers respect the limits of their authority. Bounded 
authority represents an intermingling of procedural and outcome-related evaluation. To 
believe that officers misuse their power – by not respecting people’s rights, by arresting 
people for ‘no good reason,’ by behaving in illegal ways, etc. – is to believe (a) that they do 
not follow the correct procedures that derive neutral and fair decision-making and (b) that 
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they engage in concrete actions that overstep their rightful role in society. Respondents were 
asked how often (if ever) they thought the police: 
 
 … exceeded their authority? 
 …abused their power?  
 …acted as if they are above the law?   
 …violated people’s freedoms?   
 …got involved in situations that they have no right to be in? 
 …harassed and intimidated people?   
 




Fourth, respondents were asked about issues of police surveillance and privacy. The five 
questions reflected a range of ways in which people use technology to collect 
communications often viewed as private: 
 
 How often would you say the police…listen to the content of telephone calls of 
people who are not criminals? 
 How often would you say the police…track where people who are not criminals are 
using the GPS signal on their phones? 
 How often would you say the police…monitor what people who are not criminals say 
on the internet? 
 The police respect people's privacy when they conduct investigations and enforce the 
law (agree/disagree) 
 The police respect people's privacy except when the person being investigated is a 
member of certain racial or ethnic group (agree/disagree) 
 
The response alternatives for the first three measures were (1) not at all often, (2) not very 
often, (3) fairly often and (4) very often. The response alternatives for the final two measures 
were (1) strongly disagree, (2) tend to disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) tend to 
agree and (5) strongly agree.  
 
Distributive justice 
Finally, like Tankebe (2013) and Jackson et al. (2011) we investigate whether the distribution 
of policing resources between different social groups is a normatively relevant consideration. 
Respondents were asked: 
 
 Thinking about when victims report crimes in the UK, do you think the police treat 
rich people worse, poor people worse, or are rich and poor treated equally? Rich 
people treated worse; poor people treated worse; rich and poor treated equally  
 And when victims report crimes in the UK, do you think the police treat some people 
worse because of their race or ethnic group, or is everyone treated equally? People 
from minority racial or ethnic backgrounds treated worse; people from the same race 
or ethnic group as most the UK people treated worse; everyone treated equally 
regardless of their race or ethnic group 
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Unlike the other four dimensions of policing behaviour – which we treat as latent variables, 
see the analytical strategy and scaling sections below for more information – we combine 
answers to the two distributive fairness questions in a more pragmatic way. For each 
respondent we count the number of times that they say that ‘poor people’ and ‘people from 
minority racial or ethnic backgrounds’ are treated worse. 
 
Contact with police. In order to analyze the statistical effects of direct, interpersonal contact 
with the police on legitimacy judgements, respondents were asked whether police officers 
had made contact with them for any reason in the past two years. Out of the 1,004 
respondents who answered this question, 272 (27%) reported having experienced at least one 
police-initiated encounter. They were asked two questions about their experience: first, 
whether the police made fair decisions; and second, whether the police treated them fairly. 
The same questions were asked regarding whether they had contacted or approached the 
police for any reasons. Public-initiated contact was more frequent than police-initiated 
contact, with 665 (66%) individuals reporting the experience. We constructed two separate 
indices of procedurally fair or unfair contact with law enforcement: officer-initiated and 
citizen-initiated. 
 
Police legitimacy. First, respondents’ felt obligation to obey police authority was assessed by 
tapping into their expressed intention to acquiesce to police directives and decisions. 
Respondents were asked:  
 
Now some questions about your duty towards the police in the UK, where duty means 
you have a moral responsibility to obey the police. Using a scale from 1 to 7 where 
1=not at all my duty and 7=completely my duty, To what extent do you feel it is your 
moral duty to…  
 
Second, respondents completed items assessing the degree to which they felt that the police 
acted in ways that aligned with normative expectations regarding appropriate and desirable 
conduct (Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b). Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
 The police usually act in ways that are consistent with my own ideas of right and 
wrong. 
 The police can be trusted to make the right decisions  






We first examine the scale properties of our five aspects of police trustworthiness. We take a 
reflective approach to measurement that implies a series of connected assumptions – that 
these are unobservable psychological constructs, that changes in observed variables or 
 … back the decisions made by the police because the police are legitimate 
authorities? 
 …back the decisions made by the police even when you disagree with them? 
 …do what the police tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with the 
reasons? 
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indicators are taken to reflect changes in a latent construct, and that our imperfect behavioural 
indicators are subject to measurement error. We also assume that the correlations between the 
measures are by virtue of them measuring the same underlying concept of interest, and 
further that the variance in each indicator that is not shared is measurement error.  
 
We then assess the degree to which people’s attitudes towards the trustworthiness of the 
police (in terms of treatment and decision-making, bounded authority, effectiveness, 
distributive justice, and surveillance concerns) are linked to recent police contact using 
structural equation modeling (SEM). We present our results graphically. Our analytical 
strategy seeks to clarify what can be said about the correlations in the broader population 
between contact with the police, beliefs about diverse aspects of observed and unobserved 
police behaviour, and different forms of police legitimacy. The direction of the arrows in the 
path analysis is not meant to imply that we have demonstrated causality. By collecting data 





Table 1 summarizes the results from a series of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) models 
using MPlus 7.2 (with indicators set as categorical). The approximate fit statistics suggest 
that, while a series of five-factor models fit the data poorly (as do four-factor, three-factor, 
two-factor and one-factor models), the six-factor model fits well (note that the distributive 
fairness index is a single manifest indicator – see the constructs and measures section above). 
This suggests that trust in police effectiveness, trust in police procedural justice, trust in 
police distributive justice, bounded authority and surveillance/privacy can be treated as 
separate judgements; while they are strongly correlated they nevertheless seem to be 
empirically distinct. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 presents correlations, means and variances of latent variables estimated within the 
six-factor confirmatory factor-analysis model (including the single indicator of distributive 
fairness). We see moderately strong bivariate associations between the following pairs of 
variables: (a) police effectiveness and procedural fairness (r=.60); (b) procedural fairness and 
bounded authority (r=.66); (c) normative alignment and procedural fairness (r=.73); (d) 
normative alignment and bounded authority (r=.67); and (e) normative alignment and felt 
moral duty to obey. In the six-factor model, most factors loadings and R
2
s are relatively high, 
indicating good scale reliability. For trust in police effectiveness the standardized factor 
loadings range from .67 to .80, and the R
2
s range from .45 to .63. For trust in police 
procedural fairness the standardized factor loadings range from .82 to .86, and the R
2
s range 
from .67 to .75. For trust in police bounded authority the standardized factor loadings range 
from .74 to .93, and the R
2
s range from .50 to .86. For surveillance practices the standardized 
factor loadings range from .51 to .97, and the R
2
s range from .27 to .95. For felt moral duty to 
obey the police the standardized factor loadings range from .67 to .90, and the R
2
s range from 
.47 to .82. For normative alignment the standardized factor loadings range from .71 to .89, 
and the R
2
s range from .51 to .80.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Linking direct contact with trust in the police  
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It is important to understand how direct, interpersonal contact with police predicts 
judgements relates to other potential predicates of police trustworthiness (Tyler & Fagan 
2008). Contact is directly related to procedural justice concerns, but it is not clear whether it 
will be associated with other predicates such as bounded authority and distributive justice.  
 
Figure 1 reports our first set of findings, using SEM to link contact with the police to 
judgements about five elements of police conduct and organization. In this model, two 
dichotomous variables are used for police-initiated contact: (a) contact experienced as 
something other than fair, and (b) contact experienced as fair; and two dichotomous variables 
are used for public-initiated contact: (c) contact experienced as something other than fair and 
(d) contact experienced as fair. Correlations between these four variables to the five 
judgements of trustworthiness are then estimated.  
 
The fit of the model is acceptable according to approximate fit statistics. Consistent with 
prior studies, we see that contact experienced as something other than fair is a negative 
predictor for all components of policing behaviour except for surveillance. The strongest 
statistical effect is for procedural justice. Contact experienced as fair had a slightly weaker, 
but this time positive, statistical effect on all measures except surveillance and bounded 
authority.  
 
In sum, divergent experiences of contact with police are more strongly correlated with 
judgements about procedural justice, and less strongly linked to judgements about distributive 
justice and police efficacy. There is a yet weaker correlation to both bounded authority and 
surveillance judgements. Only a relatively small amount of variance of each trustworthiness 
judgement, however, is explained by contact (the R
2
s range from 1% to 9%). This implies 
that judgements about various dimensions of policing conduct and organization cannot be 
reduced to assessments based on interpersonal contact alone. 
 
What legitimizes the police in the eyes of the policed? 
 
We next examine the extent to which legitimacy is predicted by the various attitudinal 
judgements. As described earlier, rather than stipulating as a theoretical matter the contents of 
legitimacy, we seek to explore how different elements of police conduct might be 
normatively salient in relation to different kinds of legitimacy judgements.  
 
Figure 2 reports key findings from a fitted SEM that links the five aspects of police conduct 
and organization under analysis here to our bifurcated concept of legitimacy. We find that 
61% of the variance of normative alignment is explained by an additive combination of the 
five trustworthiness judgements related to police conduct and organization. Procedural justice 
and bounded authority are the strongest positive predictors. This indicates that when people 
believe that the police in their community are fair in their personal interactions with citizens 
and respect the limits of their power and authority, they are also more likely to believe that 
the same officers acts according to one's values about how authority should be wielded.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In addition, we find that 28% of the variance of duty to obey is explained by the five aspects 
of police conduct we measure. Among those, three (effectiveness, procedural justice and 
bounded authority) are moderately strong positive predictors. This indicates that when people 
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believe that the police in their community are effective, fair and respect the limits of their 
power and authority, they are also more likely to feel a contentless duty to obey police 
commands and directives. Third, we find that the measure of police surveillance has no 
statistical effect on legitimacy judgements of either kind. Finally, normative alignment and 
duty to obey are positively correlated, even after adjusting for effectiveness, fairness, 
bounded authority and surveillance (r=.40).  
 
Figure 3 reports the results of a model that also includes a path from normative alignment to 
duty to obey. The theory motivating this model is that people feel a moral duty to obey the 
police in large part because they believe that the police are an appropriate, just and proper 
institution (cf. Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b). Furthermore, when the police behave in 
accordance with societal values about the appropriate role/duties of the law, people’s own 
values about their responsibilities/obligations as citizens are activated in response (here, to 
feel a moral duty to obey the police). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
This seems to be borne out by the evidence. Normative alignment does act as a statistical 
mediator. First, three of the five components of policing behaviour measured (effectiveness, 
procedural justice, and bounded authority) have a strong correlation with normative 
alignment. Distributive justice and surveillance measures, however, do not seem to be related 
to normative alignment. Next, normative alignment appears to mediate powerfully the key 
associations with duty to obey. Finally, the magnitudes of the effect sizes of procedural 
justice and bounded authority on duty to obey are each reduced considerably. Surveillance 
and distributive justice measures, in contrast, respectively fail to reach significance or are 
only weakly significant. Table 3 summarises an effect decomposition run using MPlus 7.2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The relation of police effectiveness to both normative alignment and on duty to obey is worth 
stressing. Although police effectiveness is affiliated to normative alignment, it provides an 
even stronger prediction of the duty to obey controlling for the effect of normative alignment. 
This suggests that the effect of police effectiveness is distinct and different from the other 
components of policing related to normative alignment, such as procedural justice and 
bounded authority. 
 
Finally, we bring in contact with the police to a new fitted SEM. Table 4 summarizes in 
numerical form the coefficients associated with the pathways from interpersonal encounters 
with the police to the two measures of legitimacy, normative alignment and the duty to obey. 
Each row of the table presents the marginal effect of a specific form of contact (positive or 
negative) with police upon one strand of legitimacy judgement (either normative alignment or 
the duty to obey) as mediated by either procedural justice or bounded authority. We see a 
complex series of indirect statistical effects of contact on legitimacy. On the one hand, 
positively received encounters tend to be associated with higher expected values of duty to 
obey via higher levels of trust in police procedural fairness, trust in police use of authority, 
and normative alignment. On the other hand, negatively received encounters tend to be 
associated with lower expected values of duty to obey via lower levels of trust in police 
procedural fairness, trust in police use of authority, and normative alignment.  
 





Our paper began with the observation that procedural justice scholarship has adopted a 
narrow focus on the components that may legitimate the police in the eyes of citizens. Prior 
studies have tended to focus on interpersonal contact, and on the concepts of procedural 
fairness and effectiveness, and only intermittently upon issues like bounded authority and 
distributive justice. Moreover, no previous study has attended to the effect of surveillance 
practices. Our first goal was to fill that gap by analyzing the effect of direct, unmediated 
contact with police and also five general aspects of police conduct and behaviour on 
legitimacy. A second goal was to show the usefulness of a ‘contentless’ definition of 
legitimacy that is defined and analyzed separately from predicate forms of police behaviour. 
By exploring whether a broader range of police behaviours can legitimize or delegitimize the 
police to different degrees, we defined people’s perceptions of these behaviours not as 
legitimacy, but rather as possible sources of legitimation with contingent empirical effects. 
 
To begin, we found that direct, interpersonal contact with police explains only a small 
amount of the variance of judgements about general forms of police conduct and 
organization, and that some of these judgements are also predicates of legitimacy. This 
finding is consistent with the recent literature on legal socialization (Fagan & Tyler 2005; 
Trinkner & Cohn 2014; Trinkner & Tyler 2016), which suggests individuals accrue 
legitimacy-relevant information about police from a plurality of sources as they mature from 
childhood to adulthood. Individuals in our sample seemed to attend to a wide range of 
observed and unobserved elements of policing when forming legitimacy judgements.  
 
Most importantly, procedural justice and bounded authority were the two key predictors of 
normative alignment, and their effect on the felt duty to obey was largely mediated via 
normative alignment. Hence, when people thought that the police treated citizens fairly, made 
decisions in objective ways, and also respected the limits of their power, they also tended to 
think that the police act in ways that were consistent with their sense of right and wrong. This 
sense of normative alignment in turn seemed to induce a felt moral duty to obey the police. In 
contrast, we found that judgements of police effectiveness had a direct statistical effect on the 
felt duty to obey that was not mediated by normative alignment. Finally, whereas distributive 
justice judgements had a weak relation to the duty to obey and no apparent effect on 
normative alignment, measures of surveillance were uncorrelated with either kind of 
legitimacy judgement.  
 
Because we find powerful affiliations between procedural justice, and in particular direct and 
unmediated experiences with police, and legitimacy judgements, our results are consistent 
with the large body of procedural justice research on that point. In other respects, however, 
our results extend the foundational procedural justice model in a number of ways. We 
emphasize five points here.  
 
First, the isolation of a statistical effect from bounded authority on legitimacy is a threshold 
finding. Previous procedural justice studies have explored the quality of police behaviour as 
measured against objective standards of fairness, impartiality and respect. This study suggests 
an additional metric should receive greater attention: that police do not abuse the authority 
that has been vested in them, but rather comply with shared norms of the appropriate official 
conduct. This is distinct from the concept of legality, which others have posited as important 
albeit without evidence. The effect we find is from socially derived conceptions of 
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appropriate behaviour, rather than legally defined parameters of police authority, which the 
public is largely unaware of (Meares et al., 2014). As a result, it may be that a policing 
measure is authorized by law (such as the authority to conduct stops and searches in urban 
areas), but nonetheless violates individuals’ sense of bounded authority. It may also be that a 
species of police behaviour falls outside of legal boundaries, but is not perceived as a 
violation of the social bounds of police authority.  
 
A second important finding relates to effectiveness. In contrast to procedural justice and 
bounded authority, police effectiveness judgements had strong links to felt duty to obey but 
this relationship did not appear to be mediated by normative alignment. Rather, a perception 
that the police are effective does not appear to be related to normative alignment with the 
police. Even if police are not perceived as acting in desirable, correct and expected ways, 
they still seem able to some extent to instil a felt duty to obey merely by dint of perceived 
effectiveness. Hence, by decomposing legitimacy into two elements, it is possible to see how 
different aspects of policing conduct and behaviour have an effect on one strand of legitimacy 
beliefs but not the other.  
 
Three, a striking—and unexpected—null result in this study is the absence of an effect of 
electronic surveillance upon judgements of police legitimacy. For a number of reasons, we 
anticipated some relationship between the perception that police use intrusive investigative 
techniques that impinge on private forms of communication, such as email and social media, 
and legitimacy judgements. In the aftermath of disclosures by Edward Snowden about the 
extent of secret data collection by both British and also American governments, there was a 
vigorous public debate about the value and appropriateness of such surveillance programs. 
Moreover, an earlier study of British Muslims’ experience with counterterrorism policing 
(Huq et al. 2011b) found that one predictor of procedural justice judgements was the extent to 
which respondents believed that their community was subject to electronic surveillance. 
There are two possible ways of interpreting our finding in light of that earlier result. First, the 
earlier result might reflect a judgement not about surveillance per se, but rather about the 
distributive equity of a policing strategy that placed all the weight of maintaining public 
security on religious and ethnic minorities. Second, the absence of an effect might be 
explained by a belief that even if the government pervasively uses electronic surveillance, the 
respondent (or the respondent’s community) is not the object of such investigative methods.  
 
The fourth important result is as follows: by teasing out the range of predicates for legitimacy 
judgements, and showing that different predicate aspects of police conduct and organization 
influence, this study points to the analytic gains from treating the predicates of policing 
behaviour as distinct from legitimacy judgements, and also from a plural understanding of 
legitimacy. Unlike Tankebe and colleagues, who a priori defined legitimacy in terms of 
procedural fairness, distributive fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness, our approach treats 
the latter as predicates, and as potential legitimating factors, allowing a number of useful 
analytic distinctions to be drawn. It draws attention to the different contributions that various 
aspects of policing can make to legitimacy judgements. Distribution justice, we suggest, 
simply does not seem to have the impact that procedural justice and bounded authority do. It 
also allows investigation of the different pathways such influence can take. Here, the 
mediating role played by normative alignment for procedural justice and bounded authority, 
but not for police effectiveness, suggest a more complex understanding of legitimacy than the 
fourfold concept offered by Bottoms and Tankebe. Finally, the distinction between the 
predicates of legitimacy and police legitimacy itself (in terms of police behaviour) invites 
consideration of new predicates of legitimacy. Although the factor tested here—police 
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surveillance—had no statistical effect on legitimacy, this kind of investigation of the diverse 
forms and missions of policing, and their influence on legitimacy, is cut short by the a priori 
definition of legitimacy offered by Tankebe and colleagues.  
 
Fifth, and relatedly, this study also suggests the value of defining legitimacy along two 
discrete dimensions. One key expectation is that citizens should feel a moral duty to obey the 
police. We operationalized the perceived right to power as normative alignment, i.e. a 
‘content-free’ sense of shared values. Survey questions like ‘the police usually act in ways 
that are consistent with my sense of right and wrong’ do not specify the relevant sense of 
right and wrong (Jackson et al., 2012a). Rather, it is an empirical question which aspects of 
police behaviour – and what societal values about how power should be exercised – 
‘populate’ that sense of appropriateness. Then, believing that officers act appropriately may 
activate a reciprocal sense among citizens that they, too, should act in normatively 
appropriate ways that support the role of the legal system and legal authorities in society. 
 
This approach to defining legitimacy may have a particular advantage when it comes to 
cross-cultural and cross-national work. It allows for the empirical investigation of whether 
different populations (for example, in different countries, or different groups in the same 
society) focus on different aspects of police organization and behaviour in making legitimacy 
judgements (cf. Jackson et al. 2011). If one specifies the values that ‘populate’ the meaning 
of legitimacy – like, for instance, procedural fairness, distributive fairness, effectiveness and 
lawfulness – then one assumes that to be legitimated, legal authorities need to act in ways that 
fulfill those values. Yet, people in different countries legitimate authorities on different bases. 
The current approach allows one could assess whether procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness are each more important predictors of the perceived 
right to power (Hough et al. 2013).  
 
The most important limitation of the current study is that the available data is not sufficient to 
show causation. The survey instrument employed in this study, although capable of 
generating nationally representative data, allows us to estimate conditional correlations in the 
population, but does not allow us to observe the dynamic effect of different sorts of 
experience and knowledge of policing. Moreover, we do not claim to have investigated all 
potential predicates of police legitimacy, or to have determined the weight assigned to each 
predicate by different populations. Future studies should analyze how the institutional 
predicates of police legitimacy differ between ethnic communities and also between national 
contexts. It may also be that the predicates of police legitimacy are sensitive to developments 
in policing strategies and missions. If police take on new roles, it is not clear that the 
predicates of legitimacy will remain unchanged. We suggest that future studies investigate 
not just the causal question, but the possibility of variation in the behavioural predicates of 
legitimacy within different populations under different social circumstances.  
 
To close, we have demonstrated that legitimacy has a wider array of predicates in police 
conduct and organization than generally recognized. By treating the latter as predicates of 
rather than as components of legitimacy, we hope to have shown the value of treating 
legitimacy as a contentless source of normative alignment, and of remaining open to the 
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Table 1. Fit statistics for a series of fitted confirmatory factor analysis models 










5703 209 <.0005 .162 .158-.165 .761 .735 
M2 
Two-factors (distinguishing 
between legitimacy and the trust 
judgements) 




effectiveness and the rest of the 
trust judgements) 





fairness and the rest of the trust 
judgements) 
2620 200 <.0005 .110 .106-.114 .895 .878 
M5 
Five-factors (combining 
bounded authority and 
procedural fairness) 
1684 195 <.0005 .087 .083-.091 .935 .923 
M6 Five-factors (combining 
procedural fairness and 
surveillance) 
2233 195 <.0005 .102 .098-.106 .911 .895 
M7 
Five-factors (combining 
procedural fairness and 
effectiveness) 
1241 195 <.0005 .073 .069-.077 .954 .946 
M8 Six-factors 674 189 <.0005 .051 .046-.055 .979 .974 
 
Data: Fiducia UK survey 
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Table 2. Correlations between elements of trust and legitimacy 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Procedural fairness  -       
2. Distributive fairness .36*** -      
3. Effectiveness .60*** .27*** -     
4. Bounded authority 
.66*** .43*** .40*** -    
5. Surveillance practices 
.18*** .11*** .00 .43*** -   
6. Felt moral duty to obey the police 
.46*** .33*** .41*** .44*** .09* -  
7. Normative alignment with the police 
.73*** .36*** .50*** .67*** .18*** .62*** - 
 
Data: Fiducia UK survey. These are correlations between latent variables estimated within a 
confirmatory factor analysis model with categorical indicators. Means of all latent variables 
were set to zero. Variances for latent variables are .73, .66, .55, .26, .82 and .51 
(respectively). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 3. Indirect statistical effects of the trustworthiness judgements on duty to obey, directly 
and indirectly via normative alignment  
 
PATHWAY VIA COEFF. SE COEFF./SE P-VALUE 
Distributive fairness to duty to obey  -.082 .032 -2.562 .010 
Distributive fairness to duty to obey via 
normative alignment 
-.008 .016 -0.484 .629 
Procedural fairness to duty to obey  -.075 .061 -1.234 .217 
Procedural fairness to duty to obey via 
normative alignment 
.231 .036 6.390 <.001 
Effectiveness to duty to obey  .150 .044 3.445 .001 
Effectiveness to duty to obey via 
normative alignment .052 .019 2.720 .007 
Boundaries to duty to obey  .041 .057 .719 .472 
Boundaries to duty to obey via 
normative alignment 
.198 .030 6.641 <.001 
Surveillance to duty to obey  -.013 .041 -0.305 .761 
Surveillance to duty to obey via 
normative alignment 
-.029 .020 -1.418 .156 
 
Standardized coefficients estimated within the structural equation model (see Figure 2). 
COEFF = regression coefficient. SE=standard error. 
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Table 4. Indirect statistical effects of the procedural fairness of respondents’ direct, 
interpersonal encounters with the police on perceived police legitimacy (both normative 
alignment and the duty to obey) 
 
PATHWAY VIA COEFF. SE COEFF./SE P-VALUE 
Stop (other than fair) to procedural 
justice to normative alignment  
-.037 .014 -2.663 .008 
Stop (other than fair) to bounded 
authority to normative alignment 
-.035 .013 -2.657 .008 
Stop (fair) to bounded authority to 
normative alignment 
.037 .015 2.496 .013 
Contact (other than fair) to procedural 
justice to normative alignment  
-.076 .018 -4.231 <.001 
Contact (other than fair) to bounded 
authority to normative alignment 
-.037 .014 -2.714 .007 
Contact (fair) to procedural justice to 
normative alignment 
.048 .016 2.911 .004 
Stop (other than fair) to procedural 
justice to normative alignment to duty 
to obey 
-.020 .008 -2.549 .011 
Stop (other than fair) to bounded 
authority to normative alignment to 
duty to obey 
-.019 .007 -2.579 .010 
Stop (fair) to bounded authority to 
normative alignment to duty to obey 
.020 .008 2.415 .016 
Contact (other than fair) to procedural 
justice to normative alignment to duty 
to obey 
-.041 .011 -3.819 <.001 
Contact (other than fair) to bounded 
authority to normative alignment to 
duty to obey 
-.020 .007 -2.600 .008 
Contact (fair) to procedural justice to 
normative alignment to duty to obey 
.026 .009 2.800 .005 
 
Standardized coefficients estimated within the structural equation model (see Figure 2). 






















SEM with categorical indicators using Mplus 7.2 
Exact fit statistics: Chi-Sq 535, 139 df, p<.001 
Approximate fit statistics: CFI .978, TLI .970 
RMSEA .053 [90%CI .049-.058] 
 
NOTE: measurement models omitted for visual ease. 
Standardized regression coefficients provided  
 










































SEM with categorical indicators using Mplus 7.2 
Exact fit statistics: Chi-Sq 677, 189 df, p<.001 
Approximate fit statistics: CFI .975, TLI .969 
RMSEA .051 [90%CI .047-.055] 
 
NOTE: measurement models omitted for visual ease. 
Standardized regression coefficients provided  
 




























SEM with categorical indicators using Mplus 7.2 
Exact fit statistics: Chi-Sq 677, 189 df, p<.001 
Approximate fit statistics: CFI .975, TLI .969 
RMSEA .051 [90%CI .047-.055] 
 
NOTE: measurement models omitted for visual ease. 
Standardized regression coefficients provided  
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